

## Message Text

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ACTION EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 NEA-10 IO-14 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-07 H-03

INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-07 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03

SS-20 USIA-15 SAM-01 SAJ-01 OMB-01 DRC-01 ACDA-19

SCCT-02 /149 W

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R 201646Z MAR 74

FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7682

INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY AMMAN

AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

AMEMBASSY BELGRADE

USMISSION BERLIN

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST

AMEMBASSY CAIRO

USMISSION GENEVA

USDEL SAT II

AMEMBASSY JIDDA

AMCONSUL LENINGRAD

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USMISSION USNATO

AMEMBASSY PRAGUE

AMEMBASSY ROME

AMEMBASSY SOFIA

AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

USMISSION USUN

AMEMBASSY WARSAW

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 PARIS 6967

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, UR, FR

SUBJECT: POMPIDOU-BREZHNEV SUMMIT MEETING

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GENEVA FOR USDEL CSCE AND MEPC DEL ; BEIRUT PASS DAMASCUS

REF: MOSCOW 3740

1. SUMMARY. IN CONVERSATION WITH CHARGE, QUAI SECRETARY GENERAL DE COURCEL DESCRIBED FRENCH-SOVIET SUMMIT AT PITSUNDA AS ROUTINE AND UNEVENTFUL. HE SAID BREZHNEV DID MOST OF TALKING AND SPOKE MAINLY IN GENERALITIES. BI-LATERAL SIDE WAS CONFINED MAINLY TO PLATITUDES, WHILE MULTI-LATERAL SIDE FOCUSED ON CSCE. ON MIDDLE EAST, SOVIETS SAW DIFFICULTIES WITH SYRIANS ON DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT AND SUGGESTED FRENCH PARTICIPATION IN GUARANTEE OF FINAL SETTLEMENT. END SUMMARY.

2. DE COURCEL, WHO WAS WITH PRESIDENT POMPIDOU IN PITSUNDA GAVE CHARGE RUN-DOWN OF MEETINGS BOTH WITH BREZHNEV AND WITH GROMYKO, WHICH PARALLELED THAT OF AMB. VIMONT ON ESSENTIAL POINTS (REFTEL). ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON VISIT WAS SUPPLIED TO EMBOFF BY QUAI DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR EAST EUROPE OMNES, BY MEMBER OF JOBERT'S CABINET, AND BY JOURNALISTS WHO ACCOMPANIED OFFICIAL PARTY. ON ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF VISIT, WE CHECKED WITH OFFICIALS BOTH AT QUAI AND AT ECONOMICS AND FINANCE MINISTRY. IN BOTH CASES, THEY DENIED THAT ANY SPECIFIC ECONOMIC ISSUES WERE RAISED.

3. ON BI-LATERAL SIDE, DE COURCEL SAID BREZHNEV HAD DELIVERED HIMSELF OF LONG DISCOURSE ON NEED FOR GOOD FRANCO-SOVIET RELATIONS AND THEIR DEVELOPMENT IN ALL SPHERES. HE SAID SOVIETS SHOWED A WILLINGNESS TO IMPROVE CONSULTATIONS AND IN GENERAL OVERCOME THE DIFFICULTIES THAT AROSE LAST YEAR IN THEIR RELATIONS WITH THE FRENCH. OMNES CONFIRMED THAT FRENCH AND SOVIETS HAD NOW STARTED EXCHANGING POSITION PAPERS, RECALLING THAT SUGGESTION FOR THIS HAD BEEN BROACHED BY GROMYKO IN FEBRUARY. HE ADDED THAT FRENCH WERE QUITE UNHAPPY WITH THIS PROCEDURE, CONSIDERING IT FORMAL, TIME-CONSUMING AND INADEQUATE, BUT HAD DECIDED TO GO ALONG TO PLEASE THE SOVIETS.

4. IN RESPONSE TO QUESTION WHETHER FRENCH HAD RAISED  
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POSSIBILITY OF INCREASED DELIVERIES OF OIL AND NATURAL GAS, DE COURCEL REPLIED IN NEGATIVE. OMNES SAID HE HAD PREPARED BRIEFING PAPER ON THE SUBJECT BUT DOUBTED IT HAD BEEN USED. HE NOTED THAT SOVIETS WERE FALLING BEHIND IN DELIVERIES GENERALLY AND SAID THAT THEY COULD NOT HELP FRENCH MUCH IN ANY CASE. DE COURCEL DID SAY THAT QUESTION OF OIL PRICE AND SCARCITY HAD BEEN TOUCHED ON, WITH SOVIETS MENTIONING SIBERIAN DEVELOPMENT AND

FRENCH ALLUDING TO ARAB TIES AS RESPECTIVE MEANS OF  
EASING PROBLEM.

5. DE COURCEL SAID CSCE CONSTITUTED BURDEN OF DISCUS-  
SION IN MULTI-LATERAL AREA. HE SAID SOVIETS MADE STRONG  
PITCH TO FRENCH FOR JOINT EFFORTS IN PUSHING CSCE FOR-  
WARD, CITING PREVIOUS COOPERATION WHICH HAD HELPED GET  
IT LAUNCHED. BREZHNEV RAISED CBM ISSUE, ASSERTING THAT  
SOVIETS WOULD NEVER AGREE TO GIVE PRIOR NOTIFICATION ON  
MANEUVERS OR MOVEMENTS OF A DIVISION, A REGIMENT OR A  
BATTALION ON SOVIET TERRITORY AS FAR EAST AS THE URALS.  
SOMEWHAT TO FRENCH SURPRISE, THE SOVIETS DID NOT RAISE  
SUBJECT OF CSCE FOLLOW-ON, BUT, AS NOTED REFTEL, THE  
FRENCH WERE IMPRESSED BY SOVIET RIGIDITY ON INVIOABIL-  
ITY OF FRONTIERS AND CAVEAT ON NO INTERFERENCE IN  
INTERNAL AFFAIRS FOR BASKET III. WHILE BREZHNEV USED

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USMISSION GENEVA

USDEL SALT II 15

AMEMBASSY JIDDA

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AMEMBASSY LONDON  
USMISSION USNATO  
AMEMBASSY PRAGUE  
AMEMBASSY ROME  
AMEMBASSY SOFIA  
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV  
USMISSION USUN  
AMEMBASSY WARSAW

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EXAGGERATED LANGUAGE TO SUPPORT SOVIET POSITION ON  
THESE ISSUES, HE DID NOT GO INTO DETAIL AND GAVE NO  
HINT AT POSSIBLE COMPROMISES.

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6. THE MIDDLE EAST WAS LARGELY RESERVED BY PRINCIPALS  
FOR DISCUSSION BETWEEN JOBERT AND GROMYKO. THE SOVIET  
FOREIGN MINISTER WAS PESSIMISTIC ABOUT BRINGING THE  
SYRIANS TO ACCEPT A DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT, REMARKING  
THAT SYRIAN FOREIGN MINISTER KHADDAM SEEMED TO TAKE A  
MUCH HARDER LINE THAN PRESIDENT ASSAD. DE COURCEL  
NOTED THAT THIS HAD BEEN JOBERT'S OBSERVATION WHILE IN  
DAMASCUS AS WELL. ON THE POSSIBILITY OF A PALESTINIAN  
STATE, DE COURCEL ECHOED VIMONT'S REMARK THAT THE FRENCH  
BELIEVED THE SOVIETS WERE ATTRACTED TO THE IDEA. AS AN  
ASIDE, DE COURCEL, SAID FRENCH THINKING WAS IN THIS  
DIRECTION TOO. BREZHNEV TOLD PRESIDENT POMPIDOU THAT  
A FINAL MIDDLE EAST SETTLEMENT WOULD PROBABLY BE SUBJECT  
TO A SYSTEM OF INTERNATIONAL GUARANTEES INVOLVING  
STATES NOT DIRECTLY PARTICIPATING IN THE GENEVA CONFER-  
ENCE. THE STRONG IMPLICATION WAS THAT THE FRENCH WOULD  
BE BROUGHT IN. PRESIDENT POMPIDOU REPLIED SIMPLY THAT  
HE HAD TAKEN NOTE OF BREZHNEV'S STATEMENT.

7. ACCORDING TO OMNES, POMPIDOU MADE A PASSING REFERENCE  
TO US-SOVIET CONCERTATION IN HIS OPENING PLENARY STATE-  
MENT. BREZHNEV REPLIED MATTER OF FACTLY THAT SOVIET  
RELATIONS WITH THE US DID NOT LIMIT FREEDOM OF ACTION  
WITH REGARD TO THIRD POWERS. DE COURCEL REPORTED THIS  
IN MORE DIRECT TERMS, SAYING BREZHNEV HAD REPEATED  
ASSURANCES GIVEN TO PRESIDENT POMPIDOU LAST JULY THAT  
THERE WAS NO US-SOVIET CONDOMINIUM.

8. IN CONVERSATION WITH OMNES, EMBOFF NOTED STATEMENT  
ASCRIBED TO POMPIDOU DURING SUMMIT THAT THE USSR WAS IN  
THE EAST AND FRANCE WAS IN THE EXTREME WEST, AND HIS  
PRESS CONFERENCE REMARK THAT FRANCE WOULD REMAIN FAITH-

FUL TO ITS EUROPEAN AND OTHER FRIENDSHIPS. HE ASKED WHETHER THIS WAS INTENDED AS ASSURANCE TO FRANCE'S ALLIES. REACTION OF OMNES WAS THAT THIS HAS ALWAYS BEEN FRENCH ATTITUDE AND THAT FRENCH HAVE ALWAYS IN PAST STRESSED BASIC WESTERN ORIENTATION WHEN DEALING WITH SOVIETS. HE ADMITTED THAT FRENCH BELIEVED BALANCE BETWEEN EAST AND WEST WAS GOOD THING, BUT SAID THIS SEEMED TO BE US POLICY AS WELL. HE STRESSED, HOWEVER, THAT FRANCE NEVER HAD ILLUSIONS OVER BASICALLY ADVERSARY  
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SOVIET INTENTIONS. WHEN EMBOFF PUT SAME QUESTION TO MEMBER OF JOBERT'S CABINET, HE SAID HE FELT PRESIDENT POMPIDOU'S REMARKS IN PITSUNDA WERE INDEED DELIBERATELY INTENDED TO COUNTERACT ANY NOTION THAT FRANCE WOULD TAKE ADVANTAGE OF DISARRAY IN ALLIANCE TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH SOVIETS AND SEEK THEREBY TO GAIN LEVERAGE IN DEALING WITH U.S.

9. ON OTHER ASPECTS OF THE VISIT, FRENCH JOURNALIST TOLD US SOME 40 SOVIETS WHO REPRESENTED THEMSELVES AS NEWSMEN WERE SENT FROM MOSCOW TO PITSUNDA. THEIR MISSION SEEMED TO BE TO PROBE FRENCH JOURNALISTS ON FRENCH POLITICS, INCLUDING POSSIBLE SUCCESSION OF PRESIDENT POMPIDOU. OF THE THREE CANDIDATES DISCUSSED -- CHABAN DELMAS, GISCARD AND FAURE -- THE SOVIETS SEEMED TO PREFER FAURE. ANOTHER JOURNALIST -- AN AMERICAN -- SAID HE WAS TOLD BY ELYSEE PRESS SPOKESMAN THAT WORKING DINNER WAS CANCELLED THE FIRST NIGHT BECAUSE OF FATIGUE OF PRESIDENT POMPIDOU. HE SAID SPOKESMAN TRIED TO SUGGEST CLOSE SOVIET-FRENCH ACCORD OVER MIDDLE EAST IN BRIEFING SEVERAL NEWSMEN TO EFFECT THAT SOVIETS HAD OFFERED THE FRENCH A ROLE IN THE GENEVA CONFERENCE. HOWEVER, WHEN NEWSMEN PRESSED, HE ADMITTED SOVIET "OFFER" HAD BEEN CONFINED TO FINAL STAGE OF CONFERENCE.

10. COMMENT. WHILE CONCRETE RESULTS OF THIS SUMMIT WERE CLEARLY MEAGER AT BEST, THE FRENCH CONTINUE TO TRY TO PUT THE BEST POSSIBLE FACE ON THINGS. THEY HOPE TO MAINTAIN AT LEAST THE FACADE OF WHAT GENERAL DE GAULLE ONCE CALLED THE "BELLE ET BONNE ALLIANCE" TO MAXIMIZE THEIR POLITICAL INFLUENCE, MAINTAIN A GOOD ATMOSPHERE FOR REAPING CONTINUED ECONOMIC BENEFITS, AND TO HELP KEEP THE FRENCH COMMUNISTS IN CHECK. HOWEVER, THE FRENCH SEEM TO BE COMING TO AN EVER INCREASING AWARENESS OF THE LIMITATION ON THEIR RELATIONS WITH MOSCOW -- A FACT WHICH RECEIVED RENEWED DEMONSTRATION AT PITSUNDA.  
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